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How is it possible that a treaty that according to our Supreme 
Court offers no recourse, no change in American law, no 
access to American courts, how is it possible that such a treaty 
could threaten anybody in our country?  The answer is simple, 
it doesn’t, and it can’t.   
— Secretary of State, then Senator from Massachusetts, John Kerry.1 
In short, there is no reason for our country to give up our 
sovereignty to the United Nations when it comes to providing 
benefits and protections for the disabled in America.  
Furthermore, it would be an egregious move to deny parents of 
children with disabilities the right to do what they think is in 
their child’s best interest in exchange for some illegitimate 
claim that disabled Americans will have better treatment 
abroad.  CRPD must be defeated. 
— Former Sen. Rick Santorum2 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
All eyes are watching as the United States contemplates ratification of the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.  This 
Note first examines the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD) by describing its purposes, functions, and goals.  This 
examination reveals that the importance of the CRPD cannot be downplayed; 
for the 650 million disabled persons worldwide, the CRPD serves as a 
hallmark of international progress towards the empowerment of all people 
with disabilities.3  
Notwithstanding its celebrated formation, however, the CRPD’s 
functionality cued warning sirens for the United States when the Convention 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Sunlen Miller, Bob Dole Can’t Sway Republicans to Back UN Disabilities Treaty, ABC 
NEWS (Dec. 4, 2012, 3:25 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/12/bob-dole-cant-
sway-republicans-to-back-un-disabilities-treaty/.  
 2 Rick Santorum, This Treaty Crushes U.S. Sovereignty, WND (Dec. 2, 2012, 8:43 PM), 
http://www.wnd.com/2012/12/this-treaty-crushes-u-s-sovereignty/.             
 3 INCLUSION FOR ALL: THE UN CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 
1 (Deborah A. Ziegler ed., 2010). 
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was debated during the 112th Congress in 2012.4  This Note investigates the 
reasons behind Congress’s hesitation in ratifying the Convention, and will do 
so in the shadow of the United States’ strong stance on the rights of the 
disabled, exemplified by current domestic policy.5   
Although the United States is a leader in the push for disability rights on 
an international stage, the CRPD creates possible national sovereignty 
concerns for the U.S.—concerns, which, if left unaddressed, could threaten 
the authority of U.S. law according to some U.S. policymakers.6  The 
validity of these concerns about national sovereignty will be addressed 
within this Note. 
Additionally, this Note considers the fine balance between compliance 
with desirable international treaties and the need to safeguard domestic 
policy.  One often utilized yet controversial method of balancing these 
subject matters is the use of reservations, understandings, or declarations, 
more commonly known as “RUDs.”7  The history behind RUD usage will be 
surveyed, along with current attitudes towards these tools. 
In light of these considerations, one question remains: Can and should the 
United States submit a RUD to the CRPD?  RUDs have explicit restraints 
that must be adhered to by any nation utilizing them, including the limitation 
that a RUD cannot be incompatible with the object and purpose of the 
treaty.8  This Note addresses whether the United States can successfully 
make a reservation to the CRPD that serves to protect domestic policy while 
remaining compatible with the CRPD’s object and purpose. 
Once it is established that it would be a calculated, although advisable, 
risk for the United States to submit a RUD, the analysis is not over.  Just 
because the United States is of the opinion that the RUD is permissible does 
not mean that the rest of the world will vehemently agree; other nations may 
view the RUD as “prohibited” and thus involve the United States in a 
perilous debate over the RUD’s validity.9  This Note examines the likelihood 
                                                                                                                   
 4 LUISA BLANCHFIELD ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 7-5700, THE UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: ISSUES IN THE U.S. RATIFICATION 
DEBATE R42749, at 1–8 (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42749.pdf. 
 5 NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, FINDING THE GAPS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
DISABILITY LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS 
OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES (CRPD) (2008), reprinted in INCLUSIONS FOR ALL, supra note 
3, at 74–81. 
 6 Anderson Cooper, U.N. Treaty ‘Could have an Impact,’ AC360 BLOG (Dec. 7, 2012, 11:36 
PM), http://ac360.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/07/u-n-treaty-could-have-an-impact/?hpt=ac_bn1.  
 7 ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 131–33 (2d ed. 2007) (defining 
reservations and explaining their use in multilateral treaties). 
 8 Id. at 134–38. 
 9 Id. at 138–39. 
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of this occurring, and answers the provocative question of whether foreign 
policy dangers outweigh any foreign policy benefits that would result from 
submitting a reservation to the CRPD. 
Decisively, the current state of the international stage suggests that 
utilizing a reservation for the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities is well worth the risk.  Neither national sovereignty concerns nor 
potential international backlash to a RUD dwarf the need for ratification of 
the Convention.  
II.  BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE CRPD 
The brainchild of disability advocates who worked for decades towards 
the development of a disability convention, the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities formally began on December 19, 2001.10  General 
Assembly resolution 56/168, passed in December of 2001, created an Ad 
Hoc Committee tasked with considering “proposals for a comprehensive and 
integral international convention to promote and protect the rights and 
dignity of persons with disabilities, based on the holistic approach. . . .”11  As 
the first binding international treaty of its kind, the initial stages of the CRPD 
garnered the backing of governments, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and disability people’s organizations (DPOs) alike.12   
The creation of this Ad Hoc Committee marked the start of the five-year 
drafting process that ultimately crafted the CRPD.13  Over forty nations and 
400 different DPOs and NGOs comprised the Ad Hoc Committee, signifying 
a shift in global policy towards an attitude of respect for individuals with 
disabilities.14 
On December 13, 2006, the United Nations General Assembly adopted 
the CRPD.15  Then, on March 30, 2007, the Convention opened for 
signatures,16 indicating the start of a long and multifarious road towards a 
                                                                                                                   
 10 Arlene S. Kanter, The Promise and Challenge of the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 287, 288 (2007). 
 11 G.A. Res. 56/168, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/229 (Dec. 18, 2002); see also Ad Hoc Committee 
on a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on the Protection and Promotion 
of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, U.N. ENABLE available at http://www. 
un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/adhoccom.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2014) [hereinafter Ad Hoc 
Committee Report] (describing the Ad Hoc Committee’s eight sessions).  
 12 Kanter, supra note 10, at 288. 
 13 Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 11. 
 14 Kanter, supra note 10, at 289. 
 15 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter CRPD], available at http://www.un.org/disabilities/convention/conventionfull.shtml.  
 16 Id. art. 42.  
2014] U.S. SOVEREIGNTY AND THE CRPD  253 
 
United States ratification decision.17  With eighty-two nations signing on its 
inaugural day, the Convention had the highest number of first-day signatories 
of any United Nations treaty in history.18  The CRPD had undoubtedly seized 
the world’s attention, and its momentum would not drastically slow in the 
weeks and years to come.  Since opening for signature, there are now 147 
ratifications and accessions to the Convention and 158 signatories to the 
Convention, including the United States.19   
The objectives and principles laid out in the adopted CRPD primarily 
came about as a way to combat the abysmal reality of how people with 
disabilities are disregarded on a global scale.  Ten percent of the world’s 
population is living with a disability, 80% of all persons with disabilities live 
in developing countries, and 20% of the world’s poorest people are 
disabled.20  Further, despite the aforementioned statistics, only forty-five 
countries have any anti-discrimination or disability-specific laws.21  These 
figures magnify the dire need for a global initiative that aims to level the 
playing field for individuals living with disabilities.  The CRPD was 
developed to answer that resounding bell of disparity.   
The Convention serves as a pioneering international accumulation of 
ideas, complete with the overarching themes of “dignity of the individual; 
access to justice; importance of family decision making; and access to 
education, independent living, and employment.”22  The stated purpose of the 
CRPD is to “promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities, and 
to promote respect for their inherent dignity.”23  The Convention’s 
predominant principles reflect that the global community has finally stepped 
up to the plate with regards to the equality of persons with disabilities.  As 
international actors move towards recognizing meaningful inclusion, the 
quality of life for these individuals is sure to rise.24  Furthermore, the 
Convention’s stated purpose not only provides a helpful insight into the 
                                                                                                                   
 17 BLANCHFIELD ET AL., supra note 4. 
 18 Kanter, supra note 10, at 288.  
 19 CRPD and Optional Protocol Signatures and Ratifications, U.N., http://www.un.org/dis 
abilities/documents/maps/enablemap.jpg (last visited Sept. 22, 2014).  
 20 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Some Facts about Persons with 
Disabilities, U.N., http://www.un.org/disabilities/convention/facts.shtml (last visited Sept. 7, 
2014).  
 21 Id. 
 22 INCLUSION FOR ALL, supra note 3, at 2.  
 23 CRPD, supra note 15, art. 1.  
 24 INCLUSION FOR ALL, supra note 3, at 5 (discussing how global advocacy is one of the 
most powerful ways to ensure that the rights of people with disabilities are “supported and 
strengthened”). 
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reasons behind the establishment of the treaty, but it also becomes 
tremendously important when determining whether any reservations, 
understandings, or declarations to the CRPD would be valid.25 
Moving from ideology to functionality, the CRPD creates two 
implementation tools that aim to enhance the Convention’s foundational 
theories.26  These two mechanisms are the Committee on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (the Committee or Expert Committee) and the 
Conference of States Parties (the Conference).27 
The Committee is a body of experts that reviews individual states’ 
implementations of the Convention.28  The Committee examines each state’s 
periodic reports to see what measures have been taken to further the goals of 
the CRPD.29  It is important to note that after the Committee scrutinizes a 
state’s period report, it will then return “such suggestions and general 
recommendations on the report as it may consider appropriate.”30  
Importantly, however, the recommendations given by the Committee are 
advisory only; none of their decisions are binding upon states.31 
This Committee’s oversight power is heightened if a state has signed onto 
the CRPD Optional Protocol—a separate but related international treaty that 
establishes two procedures “aimed at strengthening the implementation and 
monitoring of the Convention.”32  The two procedures created by the 
Optional Protocol are a petition process and an inquiry process.33  These 
mechanisms provide the authority to receive complaints from individuals 
whose rights have allegedly been breached in violation of the Convention, 
and subsequently undertake inquiries into the content of those petitions.34  
Essentially, the Protocol operates on the same foundation as the Convention, 
but its signing dictates that nations can be held to a higher standard of 
accountability than if the nation had solely signed or ratified the Convention 
itself.35  
                                                                                                                   
 25 AUST, supra note 7, at 136.  
 26 CRPD, supra note 15, arts. 34, 40. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. arts. 35–36. 
 30 Id. art. 36.  
 31 S. REP. NO. 112-6, at 5 (2015), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-112erp 
t6/html/CRPT-112erpt6.htm. 
 32 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Questions and Answers, U.N. 
UNABLE (2008–2009), http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?navid=23&pid=151, reprinted 
in INCLUSION FOR ALL, supra note 3, at 54–73. 
 33 CRPD, supra note 15, arts. 34–39. 
 34 INCLUSION FOR ALL, supra note 3, at 55. 
 35 Id. 
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The second implementation tool used by the Convention to enrich its 
inclusion objectives is the Conference of States Parties.36  The Conference 
meets regularly to discuss matters regarding implementation of the treaty 
(i.e., debating proposed amendments, etc.).37  Although the specifics of the 
Conference are left unaddressed by the CRPD’s textual language, its main 
purpose is the creation of a forum for consideration of any implementation 
matters.38  
It is with these foundational ideas and implementing mechanisms in mind 
that the CRPD has been presented to the potential ratifying countries.  
Although the terms of the Convention seem straightforward, the Convention, 
like most major multilateral treaties, is bursting with areas of potential 
conflict and confusion.  While many nations have confidently ratified the 
Convention, many have refused to do so.39  Captivated by fears over national 
sovereignty, some nations and their citizens simply do not think the CRPD’s 
rewards outweigh its risks.40 
III.  THE UNITED STATES AND THE CRPD: A HISTORY 
In December 2012 the U.S. Senate failed to ratify the CRPD falling a 
mere five votes short of the required super majority vote.41  The vote to not 
ratify was due to a variety of concerns; most importantly, there was concern 
whether the Convention could stretch its authority beyond the U.S.’s ratified 
intent.42  The Senate was afraid that the Convention could one day interfere 
with the functioning of the United States’ federalist system.43   
Congress’s worries are best articulated as falling under the umbrella of 
national sovereignty; the centerpiece of the United States’ anxiety toward the 
Convention is derived from the belief that the treaty could supersede U.S. 
                                                                                                                   
 36 Id. at 65. 
 37 Id. 
 38 CRPD, supra note 15, art. 40. 
 39 Convention and Optional Protocol Signatures and Ratification: Countries and Regional 
Integration Organizations, U.N. ENABLE, http://www.un.org/disabilities/countries.asp?navid= 
17&pid=166 (last visited Sept. 7, 2014).  
 40 See BLANCHFIELD ET AL., supra note 4, at 1–8 (“In debates regarding U.S. ratification of 
CRPD, the treaty’s possible impact on U.S. sovereignty has been a key area of concern.”); 
Anderson Cooper, Farris: U.N. Treaty ‘Is a Law,’ AC360 BLOG (Dec. 11, 2012, 12:55 AM), 
http://ac360.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/11/farris-u-n-treaty-is-a-law/?iref=allsearch (discussing 
how the treaty would give the U.N. power to control parents’ decisions for their children).  
 41 BLANCHFIELD ET AL., supra note 4, at 1. 
 42 Id. at 16–18.  
 43 Id.  
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law and thus gain authority over U.S. domestic policy.44  A careful 
examination of the United States’ historical dealings with the CRPD reveals 
that the reluctances to ratify are not arbitrary or rare.  Hesitations to ratify the 
CRPD, emanating from the fear of diminishing national sovereignty, are 
deeply entrenched within the minds of many U.S. policymakers.   
A timeline of events exposes the reality that numerous United States 
policymakers in differing branches of the federal government have expressed 
apprehension over what the CRPD’s effects would be upon U.S. 
government.45  Although the U.S. played a fundamental role in the creation 
of the CRPD, there is a marked history of reluctance to adhere to its 
standards.46  Whether the hesitation is derived from a President or Congress, 
lawmakers have never been unified toward ratification of the CRPD.47 
Specifically regarding the CRPD, the ratification process was interrupted 
during the full Senate vote.48  Before that failing vote, however, several 
important steps were taken.  First, from 2002 to 2006, the Ad Hoc Committee 
negotiated the Convention’s text.49  It is important to note that the U.S. 
participated in every session during this four-year period,50 and, in 2006, the 
Bush Administration openly favored other countries’ adoption of the General 
Assembly resolution, while also noting that there would be no signing or 
ratifying of the treaty by the United States because of national sovereignty 
concerns.51   
Several years and an administration change later, President Obama signed 
the CRPD in July 2009, and in May 2012 it was transmitted to the Senate for 
advice and consent to ratification.52  By a vote of 13–6 the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, reported the CRPD favorably to the full 
Senate.53  Finally, in December 2012 by a vote of 61–38, the full Senate 
voted against ratification of the CRPD.54  The initial battle was over, but the 
debate certainly lacked a sense of closure. 
This sequence of events leading up to the full Senate vote acted as a 
roadblock to ratification of the Convention, but proponents of the 
                                                                                                                   
 44 Id. at 16.  
 45 Id. at 2. 
 46 Id.  
 47 Id.  
 48 Id. 
 49 Id.   
 50 Id.  
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
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Convention did not halt their campaign.  The resilience of the pro-ratification 
supporters, in addition to the importance of the underlying principles behind 
the Convention, signifies the need to carefully dissect the ratification debate. 
IV.  THE UNITED STATES RATIFICATION DEBATE 
Despite the obvious battle between those who support the CRPD and 
those who oppose its ratification, the apprehensions associated with the 
treaty are hard to pin down at first glance.  In order to better understand the 
debate, the arguments for and against ratification must be examined.  
A.  The Foundations of the Anti-Ratification Argument 
First, there are extreme national sovereignty fears associated with the 
ratification of the treaty.  On the surface, the concerns associated with 
ratifying the CRPD revolve around how U.S. laws would interact with the 
provisions of the treaty—essentially, which sovereignty would win out?55  
This argument jumps to the conclusion that ratifying the CRPD would make 
the United States vulnerable to the policies of other nations (i.e., that the 
European countries would interpret certain provisions to mean that disabled 
children cannot be homeschooled, etc.).56 
The true root of the apprehension is traced back to the uncertainty of the 
Expert Committee’s power restraints in light of the United States 
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.57  The Supremacy Clause states, “all 
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”58  The CRPD Expert 
Committee serves as an implementation body with the purpose of 
periodically examining state’s compliance.  Thus the scope of the 
Committee’s power is the driving point behind the ratification debate.59  
While treaty committees do not technically possess binding power, many 
treaty committees are nevertheless viewed with hesitation.60  A powerful 
treaty committee that operates in a parallel fashion to the Constitution’s 
Supremacy Clause has presented novel concerns in the last few decades.  A 
historical tendency towards the enhancement of power for treaty bodies 
                                                                                                                   
 55 Id. at 8.  
 56 Id. at 10. 
 57 Id. at 15. 
 58 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 59 INCLUSION FOR ALL, supra note 3, at 65. 
 60 BLANCHFIELD ET AL., supra note 4, at 16.  
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creates a foreboding question mark as to how the CRPD Committee would 
operate.  
There are currently nine human rights treaty bodies that serve to monitor 
the core human rights treaties that the bodies are associated with.61  These 
treaties include: Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD), Human Rights Committee (CCPR), Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD), Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW), Committee against Torture, Committee on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC), Committee on Migrant Workers, and the 
Committee on Enforced Disappearances.62  
These treaty bodies, including the Expert Committee of the CRPD, are 
self-categorized as legal examiners.63  This legal label is partially what drives 
the angst behind questions about how a treaty body’s interpretation of a 
treaty would affect ratifying countries.  The assertion that the bodies are legal 
in nature is magnified by the fact that three treaties—the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention Against Torture, and 
the Convention Against Enforced Disappearances—unambiguously require 
interpreting bodies to give consideration to the “usefulness of the 
participation of some persons having legal experience.”64  In fact, nearly all 
treaty bodies are comprised of a large number of members with a legal 
background.65  Legal representation reinforces the idea that treaty bodies are 
not mere guidance givers; their opinions may ultimately have some force.   
Opposition to the CRPD is driven by concern that the Expert Committee 
may exceed its stated boundaries and become a powerful monitoring body 
that is capable of interfering with the lives and freedoms of the people of the 
United States.66  These worries are not without support.  When the actions of 
other United Nations treaty monitoring bodies are examined, the results show 
                                                                                                                   
 61 UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS: OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS, Human Rights Bodies, OHCHR, http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/Pages/HumanRigh 
tsBodies.aspx (last visited Sept. 7, 2014).  
 62 Id.  
 63 Kerstin Mechlem, Treaty Bodies and the Interpretation of Human Rights, 42 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 905, 913 (2009) (discussing the role of treaty bodies in the interpretation of 
human rights treaties). 
 64 Id. at 913.  
 65 Id. at 917.  
 66 BLANCHFIELD ET AL., supra note 4, at 16 (“Specifically, critics are concerned that 
committee recommendations and decisions could supersede U.S. laws and presume authority 
affecting the lives, freedoms, and decisions of private citizens.”).  
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a modern trend towards bodies whose power exceeds their original 
purpose.67 
An inspection of other United Nations treaty bodies reveals that these 
bodies have gone far beyond the confines laid out for them in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).68  The VCLT created the basics 
of how a human rights treaty monitoring body should act.69  A body’s proper 
role is to perform in accordance with these limited powers: monitor the 
periodic reports of the States Parties, honor States Parties’ requests to send a 
delegation during the consideration of their States Party’s periodic report, 
issue summaries of States Parties’ compliance in treaty body annual reports, 
and issue collective, non-binding, and non-critical comments, suggestions, 
and recommendations on States Parties’ periodic reports.70   
The bodies are to carry out these limited roles under the guideline of 
using “good faith” to interpret the “ordinary meanings” of the treaties’ 
texts.71  On a most basic level, when these limited powers are mixed with the 
necessity of using good faith, the outcome should be that all U.N. treaty 
bodies are limited in scope.  Despite that expected outcome, however, there 
is a trend towards expansion of authority—the very concept that the 
individuals against the ratification of the CRPD fear most.72 
The first of the nine human rights treaty monitoring bodies was limited to 
giving “general comments,” a term that was interpreted to mean simplified 
and non-States Party specific.73  Any general comments given by the treaty 
bodies were rare and not directed at any particular country, following the 
lead of the Commission on Human Rights in monitoring periodic reports on 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.74  This tradition soon began to 
change in favor of sweeping observations and comments that targeted 
specific ratifying nations.75  The modern general comment came about in the 
early 1990s and does not mirror the cautious practices outlined by the VCLT 
rules.76  “Most of the general comments read like a judicial opinion 
interpreting a statute.  They incorporate other treaties, conventions, and 
                                                                                                                   
 67 Joanne Pedone & Andrew R. Kloster, New Proposals for Human Rights Treaty Body 
Reform, 22 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 29, 48 (2012–2013). 
 68 Id.    
 69 Id. at 34. 
 70 Id.  
 71 Id. at 35.  
 72 Id. at 48.  
 73 Id. at 38–39. 
 74 Id.  
 75 Id. at 40–43. 
 76 Id. at 44–45.  
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statements extraneous to the treaty, and their opinions often go far beyond 
the text of the treaty.”77 In this view, the interpretations of human rights 
bodies wield tremendous power, including potentially the power to 
undermine the ratified treaty language. 
There are three prominent examples of monitoring body overreach: the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW)’s Committee; the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC) Committee; and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD Committee), created by the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD).78  These 
examples exemplify why anti-CRPD ratifiers have concrete worries about 
how the CRPD’s Expert Committee could potentially attempt to shape the 
future of U.S. domestic law.  
First, CEDAW is a United Nations treaty that is often described as an 
international bill of rights for women.79  CEDAW aims to define what 
constitutes discrimination against women, and it also establishes an agenda 
for national actions designed to end discrimination against women.80  
Articles 17–22 of CEDAW create the CEDAW Committee, a monitoring 
body that reviews the States Parties’ periodic reports on compliance with the 
treaty.81  The CEDAW Committee is only granted three powers: making 
suggestions and general recommendations, inviting specialized agencies to 
submit reports on the implementation of CEDAW, reporting annually to the 
U.N. General Assembly on its activities.82   
Importantly, the treaty does not authorize “concluding observations,” or 
observations referring to a State Party-specific evaluation issued after the 
evaluation of State Party periodic reports.83  These concluding observations 
generally include criticisms of the States Parties’ implementation of the 
treaty, in addition to steps that should be taken to remedy the concerns.84  
Although these concluding observations are often used by U.N. human rights 
                                                                                                                   
 77 Id. at 45.  
 78 Id. at 49–64.  
 79 U.N. Women: United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women, 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Text of 
Convention, U.N., http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw.htm (last visited Sept. 
7, 2014).  
 80 Id.  
 81 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, arts. 17–
22, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/ce 
daw/text/econvention.htm [hereinafter CEDAW].  
 82 Id. arts. 21–22. 
 83 Id.  
 84 Pedone & Kloster, supra note 67, at 38.  
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treaty monitoring bodies, there is no source of authority for such 
observations based upon either the VCLT or the explicit contents of the 
treaties.85  
Despite a lack of unambiguous power, the CEDAW Committee has 
disregarded the good faith limitations of the VCLT and has expanded the 
treaty provisions to concepts that were not contemplated by the states.86  The 
most prominent example of the CEDAW Committee overstepping its bounds 
can be seen in the context of abortion.87  Human rights treaties have left 
abortion matters up to States Parties, as finding any one solution to this 
controversial topic has proven unmanageable.88   
Accordingly, CEDAW’s text is absolutely silent on the topic of 
abortion.89  However, in 1999, a full twenty years after the treaty was first 
adopted, the CEDAW Committee stated that Article 12 of the CEDAW 
treaty includes a right to abortion.90  Article 12 states: 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in the field of health care in 
order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, 
access to health care services, including those related to family 
planning.91 
And from that ambiguous and broad language, the CEDAW Committee 
derived a tangible rule: Article 12 encompasses a right to abortion.92  The 
declaration of the right to abortion represented a new interpretation of Article 
12—one that did not go without consequence.93  Soon after, the CEDAW 
Committee began using concluding observations to impose the right upon 
states,94 criticizing upwards of eighty nations for restricting abortions, 
including a particularly strong reprimand towards Rwanda.95   
                                                                                                                   
 85 Id. (“[T]he authority for issuing concluding observations is almost nonexistent.  In fact, 
this phrase does not appear in any of the treaties.”). 
 86 Id. at 50. 
 87 Id.  
 88 Id.  
 89 CEDAW, supra note 81.  
 90 Pedone & Kloster, supra note 67, at 50–51.  
 91 CEDAW, supra note 81, art. 12.  
 92 See Pedone & Kloster, supra note 67, at 50–51.  
 93 Id. at 52.  
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 52–53. 
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This flexing of muscles by the CEDAW Committee may have come as a 
result of pressure from lobbyist organizations, or it could have been a means 
of self-promotion.96  Lobbyists, complete with enormous financial backing, 
ran a conference in Glen Cove, New York with the aim of having a 
“dialogue” with representatives of six major human rights treaty bodies.  The 
treaty bodies agreed to the dialogue in hopes of expanding their activities in 
the field of women’s health, specifically targeting reproductive and sexual 
health.97  Although the content of the dialogue is unknown, this strong 
outside influence, combined with the CEDAW Committee’s self-promotion, 
seems to reinforce the fears of some U.S. policymakers that are hesitant to 
ratify the CRPD. 
The autonomous nature of U.N. human rights treaty monitoring bodies is 
not limited to the actions of the CEDAW Committee.  The CERD Committee 
also has a history of overexpansion.98  The first of the binding international 
human rights treaties, CERD presented a unified condemnation of racial 
discrimination, as all States Parties agreed to actively eradicate any such 
discrimination.99  The CERD Committee has four basic functions, as laid out 
by the treaty’s text: reviewing States Parties’ reports and requesting further 
information from the States Parties as necessary; submitting an annual report 
to the U.N. General Assembly on its activities, including any suggestions and 
general recommendations based on the examination of States Parties’ 
reports; facilitating resolution of State Party complaints regarding other 
States Parties alleged treaty violations; and considering communications 
from individuals or groups claiming to be victims of treaty violations by the 
State Party after explicit consent from the subject State Party.100  The 
Committee, following modern trends towards an enlargement of power, has 
not limited itself to the confines of the treaty’s substantive provisions.101  
CERD’s Committee has issued unauthorized concluding observations and 
has consistently shown a willingness to exert influence.102 
                                                                                                                   
 96 Id. at 54.  
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. at 57–58.  
 99 Id. at 57. 
 100 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, arts. 
9, 11–14, Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. 
 101 Pedone & Kloster, supra note 67, at 58.  
 102 Id. (“Yet the greater problem has not been the practices themselves, but rather the 
authority with which the CERD Committee presumes to act.  For example, a good faith read 
of this mandate might include some procedural form of concluding observations or general 
comments, but these formats cannot be read to authorize authoritative interpretations of the 
CERD or to enforce non-treaty commitments . . . on States Parties.  The CERD Committee’s 
narrow mandate simply does not provide it with such powers.”).  
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Most notably, the CERD Committee has redefined the critically important 
term “racial discrimination.”103  Regardless of any positive effects an 
evolving definition of “racial discrimination” may have, it is the States 
Parties—not the Committee—that should be behind the alteration of the 
concept.104  Contravening the good faith obligation within the VCLT, the 
treaty body provided the stimulus for expanding “racial discrimination” 
beyond its original focus on apartheid and legal segregation.105   
The Committee Chairman has since admitted that without certain general 
recommendations made by the Committee in the 1990s, states might not 
have recognized the necessity of “pulling unintended de facto discrimination 
and discrimination against indigenous people into the definition of racial 
discrimination.”106  This overreach has not gone unnoticed; it is surely a 
reason why the CRPD has encountered resistance in the United States 
Senate.107 
Finally, the last concrete example of U.N. treaty body overextension can 
be seen within the CRC, which came into force in 1990 and recognizes a 
number of rights possessed by children.108  The Committee on the Right of 
the Child (CRC Committee or the Committee) was created to examine the 
progress made by the States Parties in achieving the realization of the 
obligations undertaken in the CRC.109  Notably, the CRC Committee has a 
broader textual mandate than any other human rights treaty body.110   
Unlike other monitoring bodies, the CRC Committee openly welcomes 
advice from third-parties and has authorized direct communication with 
individual States Parties.111  These powers are exemplified under three main 
themes.  First, third-party specialized U.N. agencies are “entitled to be 
represented at the consideration of the implementation of such provisions of 
the present Convention as fall within the scope of their mandate”—a feature 
unique to the CRC.112  This feature allows the Committee to choose agencies 
                                                                                                                   
 103 Id.  
 104 Id. at 59.  
 105 Id. at 58–59. 
 106 Id. at 60. 
 107 BLANCHFIELD ET AL., supra note 4, at 16.  
 108 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 28 I.L.M. 1448 
[hereinafter CRC]. 
 109 Id. art. 43.  
 110 Pedone & Kloster, supra note 67, at 64.  
 111 See CRC, supra note 108, arts. 43, 45 (explaining that States Party directly participate in 
the CRC committee election process and that the Committee welcomes advice from 
specialized agencies).  
 112 Id. art. 45(a).  
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to include within its discussions, magnifying how the Committee’s 
foundation of knowledge is expanding. 
The CRC treaty body mandate is also broader because it has a forwarding 
power.  When a state submits a five-year compliance report to the CRC 
Committee, and the state subsequently indicates a necessity for either 
technical assistance or advice from a third-party specialized U.N. agency, the 
Committee is then approved to forward the report to the agency with any 
comments the Committee has related to that particular request.113 
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the CRC Committee mandate is 
more expansive than any other human rights treaty in terms of direct contact 
with States Parties.  The CRC states that the Committee is sanctioned to 
directly make “suggestions and general recommendations” to a State Party, 
and is also authorized to transmit such reports straight to the State Party.114  
However, this extensive textual foundation has not quelled the thirst of 
the Committee.115  Although this is perhaps the least telling of the three 
treaty body, even the CRC Committee has overstepped its bounds to a certain 
degree.116  The Committee has issued general “comments” rather than 
“recommendations,” it has held days of thematic discussion without any 
supervision by the U.N. Secretary General, and it has issued concluding 
observations in contravention of the VCLT.117 
B.  The Anti-Ratification Argument Relating Specifically to the CRPD 
The above analysis of the breadth of the powers of the CEDAW, CERC 
and CRD Committees exemplifies why some U.S. policymakers are 
concerned over what ratification of the CRPD could mean in terms of U.S. 
sovereignty.  Human rights treaty enforcement bodies are far from inept 
entities—for better or for worse, their actions have far-reaching impacts.  
Those persons opposing ratification of the CRPD cite three specific 
provisions that, in their opinion, invite the potential for trouble.118  These 
provisions include: the lack of an explicit definition of “disability” within 
                                                                                                                   
 113 Pedone & Kloster, supra note 67, at 65.  
 114 Id.  
 115 Id. at 67 (“[T]he bottom line is that it sees itself as issuing ‘general comments on 
thematic issues,’ which goes beyond its treaty mandate and risks creating an institutional 
culture of legal noncompliance.  A critical reevaluation is necessary.”).  
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. at 68.  
 118 See S. REP. NO. 112-6 (2012) (statement of Steve Groves, Bernard and Barbara Lomas 
Fellow, Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, The Heritage Foundation), available at http:// 
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/cRPT-112erpts6.htm; BLANCHFIELD ET AL., supra note 4, at 15–20.  
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Article 1; parental authority questions derived from Article 7(2); and the 
boundaries of reproductive health as presented in Article 25.119 
First, the CRPD does not specifically define disability.120  Although 
Article 1 does explain characteristics that would qualify a person to be 
considered “disabled,” opponents of ratification cite the lack of a clearly-
defined demarcation.121  The absence of a definition troubles opponents 
because it leaves room for interpretation by the CRPD Expert Committee.  
Further, certain U.S. Senators take the stance that if the ADA can contain a 
functional definition of disability, then this revolutionary international 
disability treaty should surely be capable of doing the same.122  In essence, 
the lack of a definition raises red flags. The lack of a definition raises the 
concern that the Committee will interpret “disability” in way contrary to U.S. 
domestic law, potentially expanding the CRPD’s coverage to subject matters 
not contemplated at ratification 
Further, the text of Article 7 also creates concerns.  Article 7(2) states: “In 
all actions concerning children with disabilities, the best interests of the child 
shall be a primary consideration.”123  Opponents of ratification are fearful 
that this provision would empower the Disabilities Committee—not U.S. 
parents or even U.S. domestic law—with the ability to make educational and 
treatment-related choices for American children with disabilities.124  The 
primary example of this manifestation of fear can be seen in homeschooling 
advocates.125  Homeschooling promoters believe the Committee could 
declare homeschooling to be inconsistent with the best interests of the child 
under Article 7(2).126  This potential stripping of authority from American 
parents, in light of the modern expansion of international treaty monitoring 
bodies, is cause for uproar according to these advocates.127 
Finally, Article 25 of the treaty is also a controversial portion of text.  In 
part, Article 25 requires states to:  
                                                                                                                   
 119 CRPD, supra note 15, arts. 1, 7, 25.  
 120 Id.  
 121 See id. art. 1; S. REP. NO. 112-6, at 9 (“It stands to reason that an international treaty 
designed to end discrimination on the basis of ‘disability’ should provide a working definition 
of that term, yet the Convention provides none.”).  
 122 S. REP. NO. 112-6, supra note 118.  
 123 CRPD, supra note 15, art. 7. 
 124 BLANCHFIELD ET AL., supra note 4, at 18.  
 125 Reject the UNCRPD FAQ, HSLDA, http://www.hslda.org/landingpages/crpd/analysisand 
faq.aspx (last updated Aug. 28, 2014).  
 126 BLANCHFIELD ET AL., supra note 4, at 18. 
 127 Reject the UNCRPD FAQ, supra note 125. 
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a. Provide persons with disabilities with the same range, quality 
and standard of free or affordable health care and programmes 
as provided to other persons, including in the area of sexual 
and reproductive health and population-based public health 
programmes; [and] b. [P]rovide those health services needed by 
persons with disabilities specifically because of their 
disabilities, including early identification and intervention as 
appropriate, and services designed to minimize and prevent 
further disabilities, including among children and older 
persons; . . .128   
The main concern with Article 25 is that the term “sexual and reproductive 
health” would be interpreted to include the right to an abortion.129  This 
possibility is especially prominent because of the CEDAW Committee’s 
prior interpretation of CEDAW Article 12.130  The United Nations has been 
markedly reluctant to explicitly use the term abortion, making it likely that 
Article 25 of the CRPD could be interpreted to cover abortion-related issues 
despite the term never being used within the article’s text.131  As reflected in 
the analysis of the committees of CEDAW, CRC, and CERD, this abortion 
issue is not immaterial; international human rights committees have shown 
they are willing to exceed the scope of their traditional enforcement body 
powers.132  If the CRPD Disability Committee decides to attempt to enforce 
abortion rights via Article 25 of the CRPD, there could be a strong impact 
upon all States Parties, including the United States. 
The final prong of the argument against ratification of the CRPD cites 
already-enacted U.S. disability laws.133  The U.S. has already shown a 
definitive commitment to the equal treatment of individuals with disabilities 
through many existing laws and policies that promote equality, including the 
U.S. Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause, the Americans Disabilities Act 
                                                                                                                   
 128 CRPD, supra note 15, art. 25.  
 129 BLANCHFIELD ET AL., supra note 4, at 19. 
 130 S. REP. NO. 112-6, supra note 118; see supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text.  
 131 Steven Groves, Congressional Testimony on the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (Treaty Doc. 112-7), HERITAGE FOUNDATION (July 12, 2012), available at 
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Steven_Groves_Testimony.pdf (“Apparently 
unwilling to use the term ‘abortion’ in the debate, the proponents of establishing abortion as a 
human right use phrases such as ‘reproductive rights’ and ‘sexual and reproductive health’ as 
euphemisms for ‘abortion rights.’  The use of one such euphemism in the text of the 
Convention has extended the abortion debate into the realm of disability rights.”). 
 132 See Pedone & Kloster, supra note 67, at 50–52, 58, 67.  
 133 BLANCHFIELD ET AL., supra note 4, at 10. 
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(ADA), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (IDEA).134  Because strong policies regarding equality for 
disabled persons already exist, opponents of ratification ask why the U.S. 
should expose itself by ratifying a risky international treaty.  For them, any 
foreign policy benefits gained by ratification do not outweigh the 
conceivable dangers.135  Below, these pre-existing protections are considered. 
First, the U.S. Constitution provides for the equal protection of 
individuals with disabilities.136  The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in 
part: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.137 
In practice, this Amendment, along with the Fifth Amendment, has meant 
that when there is any governmental discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities, a rational basis scrutiny test will be applied to that 
discrimination.138  Further, the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution is also 
pertinent.  That Amendment bars the infliction of “cruel and unusual 
punishments.”139  One example of this Amendment’s effect upon people with 
disabilities is seen in the 1976 case Estelle v. Gamble.140  There, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that a deliberate indifference to prisoners’ medical 
needs, including any needs of disabled prisoners, equates to cruel and 
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.141  These two 
Amendments reinforce the idea that the U.S. has already taken sufficient 
measures to protect against discrimination of the disabled, thus making 
ratification of the CRPD superfluous.   
The CRPD’s opponents also cite the domestic laws enacted by the United 
States that aim to protect the disabled.  The ADA, enacted in 1990, is an 
influential bipartisan act that provides sweeping protections for individuals 
                                                                                                                   
 134 Id. at 10–15.  
 135 Id. at 16–17. 
 136 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 137 Id. 
 138 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Heller v. Doe, 509 
U.S. 312 (1993). 
 139 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
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268 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 43:249 
 
with disabilities.142  The ADA may already fulfill a majority of the 
obligations imposed by the CRPD, including the responsibilities regarding 
transportation, accessibility, employment, and equal participation in 
government and private programs.143  Beyond the original provisions, the 
coverage of the ADA was expanded in 2008 to include even more 
protections for people with disabilities.144  The ADA provides expansive 
safeguards for disabled individuals within the realms of employment, state 
and local governments, and public accommodations.145  
Further, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) exemplify a commitment to the equal 
treatment of individuals with disabilities.146  The Rehabilitation Act mirrors 
the ADA, but it operates in the context of federal entities and programs.147  
IDEA calls for the education of children with disabilities by   
authoriz[ing] federal funding for special education and related 
services and, for states that accept these funds, it sets out 
principles under which special education and related services 
are to be provided.  It requires that states and school districts 
make available a “free appropriate public education” (FAPE) to 
all children with disabilities, generally between the ages of 
three and 21.148 
By accentuating possible encroachments of international treaty power and 
the United States strong domestic policy regarding disability law, the 
aforementioned arguments illustrate why some policymakers are hesitant to 
ratify the CRPD.  Arguably, the “what-ifs” seem boundless and the United 
States has already proven its commitment to equality.   
                                                                                                                   
 142 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012); see 
BLANCHFIELD ET AL., supra note 4, at 11. 
 143 BLANCHFIELD ET AL., supra note 4, at 11.  
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 146 Id. at 14–15.  
 147 Id. at 14. 
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C.  The Pro-Ratification Argument: A Different Spin on Treaty Monitoring 
Bodies  
In many ways, the argument for ratification of the CRPD is less abstract 
than the argument against it and therefore more credible on its face.  On the 
most basic level, those who support ratification state that it is important for 
the U.S. to finish what it started.  As a leader in the implementation of the 
CRPD and as an outspoken leader for disability rights, the U.S. should 
adhere to the recommendations that it helped create.  Under this view, 
ratification would not require any drastic legal changes—the CRPD requires 
States Parties to consider whether their existing domestic laws satisfy CRPD 
requirements, or if any new measures are required for compliance.149  In light 
of that requirement, the U.S. has already fulfilled most, if not all, of the 
compliance standards via domestic laws such as the ADA.150  Because it 
would not be tedious to comply, and because it would heighten the 
credibility of U.S. foreign policy, ratification of the CRPD seems ideal. 
Further, addressing the specific national sovereignty concerns of those 
who oppose ratification, supporters of the CRPD fervently reiterate that the 
treaty is non-binding as to international and domestic law.151  The U.S. has 
long utilized declarations that emphasize that international human rights 
treaties are non-self-executing.152  Self-executing treaties typically act in a 
transnationalist fashion to “facilitate the domestic application of treaty-based 
international norms.”153  Non-self-executing treaties, on the other hand, are 
nationalist tools that serve to shield the domestic law of a nation against the 
treaty’s legal norms.154  The reasoning behind why courts should hold that 
non-self-executing treaties are not directly applicable by domestic courts is 
outside the scope of this Note, but it is widely accepted within the American 
system that non-self-executing treaties are not domestic law.155 
Although doctrine concerning self-executing nature of treaties is 
convoluted, one thing is clear: despite there being several human rights 
treaties ratified by the U.S. with monitoring committees similar to CRPD, 
there is “no instance where a U.S. federal court or the executive branch has 
                                                                                                                   
 149 Id. at 9.  
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. at 1.  
 152 Id. at 7. 
 153 David Sloss, Domestic Application of Treaties, reprinted in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO 
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construed a committee’s recommendations or decisions as having the force 
of law.”156  The backdrop is muddled, but the derived rule is secure. 
To further ensure that the CRPD would not directly affect domestic law, 
supporters of ratification emphasize that submitting a domestic law reservation 
to the CRPD would be an ultimate problem solver.  The reservation would 
essentially state that any U.S. obligations arising from the CRPD are restricted 
to measures appropriate to the U.S. federal system, such as the implementation 
of the ADA.157  Specifically, the federalism reservation proposed by the 
Obama Administration reads: 
This Convention shall be implemented by the Federal 
Government of the United States of America to the extent that 
it exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters 
covered therein, and otherwise by the state and local 
governments; to the extent that state and local governments 
exercise jurisdiction over such matters, the obligations of the 
United States of America under the Convention are limited to 
the Federal Government’s taking measures appropriate to the 
Federal system, which may include enforcement action against 
state and local actions that are inconsistent with the 
Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act, or other 
Federal laws, with the ultimate objective of fully implementing 
the Convention.158 
If valid, this reservation would alleviate any national sovereignty concerns 
related to the implementation of the CRPD.  To determine the legitimacy of 
such a reservation, however, it is important to understand what RUDs are 
and why they are often utilized by parties to international human rights 
treaties. 
V.  RUDS: A USEFUL TOOL 
A.  How RUDs Developed 
Because both sides of the ratification debate have some valid concerns 
and objectives, the ideal scenario would be to find a way to ratify the 
document’s uncontroversial provisions while also finding a way to not 
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adhere to the provisions with indeterminate meanings or effects.  One way of 
doing this is to use reservations, understandings, or declarations, commonly 
referred to as RUDs.159  A “reservation” is a  
unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a 
State or an international organization when signing, ratifying, 
formally confirming, accepting, approving or acceding to a 
treaty, or by a State when making a notification of succession 
to a treaty, whereby the State or organization purports to 
exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of 
the treaty in their application to that State or to that 
international organization.160 
This definition can be somewhat misleading due to the use of the term 
“unilateral,” but the unilateral simply means that the reservation is asserted 
independently, and thus has not been agreed upon by all of the negotiating 
states.161 
The U.S.’s history of submitting reservations to human rights treaties 
dates back to the post-World War II era.162  After World War II, modern 
human rights treaties began to combat atrocities against mankind and create 
an organized regime designed to defend the human rights of all persons.163  
These treaties represented a new era of change, but they also presented a vast 
array of new challenges to United States policymakers and treaty-makers 
alike.164  Human rights treaties’ provisions can both create tension between a 
nation’s long-held beliefs/rights and produce concerns about the scope of the 
treaty.165   
When treaties cause tension between a nation’s domestic policy and 
relevant treaty provisions, the issue of scope becomes fundamental.  “Human 
rights treaties touch on almost every aspect of domestic civil, political, and 
                                                                                                                   
 159 Edward T. Swaine, Treaty Reservations, reprinted in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES, 
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cultural life.  In addition, the language of these treaties is often vague and 
open-ended.”166  Because of such ambiguity, nations seek to affirmatively 
define the parameters of any vague treaty that they intend to agree upon.167  
Many times countries want to avoid the foreign policy complications of 
failing to ratify a human rights treaty, while also managing to harmonize the 
treaty with domestic law.168 
The utilization of RUDs is as an effective way to solve both of the issues 
presented above.  RUDs can both balance policies and define scope; they 
allow a nation to accept the attractive portions of a treaty while preserving 
other portions for the control of domestic laws, and they also allow a nation 
to formulate boundaries as to the treaty’s scope.169 
RUD usage first became common practice for the U.S. in the 1970s.170  
As globalization and international cooperation arose post-World War II, the 
importance of treaties became substantial.171  The U.N. had fifty-one 
Members in 1945, but by the end of 2006 membership had quickly reached 
192.172  Also, from 1975 to 1995, the amount of multilateral treaties 
skyrocketed.173  
The world landscape had changed, as signified by the rush towards treaty 
ratification, thus international strategies of cooperation changed as well.174  
Despite the fact that reservations are presently used quite frequently, 
questions remain about their validity in general and about their use in human 
rights treaties.175  Many of these questions revolve around interpretations of 
RUD limitations.176  
B.  The Limitations to RUDs 
Some scholars doubt the legitimacy of a nation using RUDs in any treaty, 
for any purpose.177  While some international law commentators think that 
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RUDs are bad policy, others take the severe stance that RUDs are legally 
invalid.178  The main arguments that support those assertions are succinctly 
stated by Bradley and Goldsmith: “[R]eservations violate international law 
restrictions on treaty conditions; that the non-self-execution declarations are 
inconsistent with the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution; and that the 
federalism understandings are inconsistent with the national government’s 
responsibility, under both domestic and international law, for treaty 
violations.”179   
For purposes of a more complete analysis of the soundness of RUD 
usage, however, it is best to assume that there will be no challenges to the 
basic employment of a RUD.  Nations have utilized reservations for several 
decades now, and most arguments over RUDs now revolve around 
interpreting the specific limitations under the VCLT.180  While nations can 
object to the usage of any RUD for any reason, they would most likely be 
ignored unless a large coalition formed.  Most small protestations would take 
the form of an objection to a reservation, a concept that will be discussed 
later.181  More commonly, RUDs are challenged because they do not 
conform to the basic rules of the VCLT.182  The VCLT makes it clear that 
neither the right to use reservations nor the magnitude of reservation usage is 
unconstrained.183 
There are three main limitations to the ability to use a reservation.184  If 
any of these limitations are implicated, the reservation is thereby 
“prohibited.”185  First, the treaty may not explicitly prohibit the reservation.  
Second, where the treaty provides that only specified reservations can be 
made, any other reservations are prohibited.   Finally, even if the first and 
second limitations do not apply, the reservation cannot be incompatible with 
the object and purpose of the treaty (this is referred to as the “Compatibility 
Test”).186  
The Compatibility Test is the most controversial and unclear of these 
limitations.187  It is often difficult to measure whether a reservation to a 
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human rights treaty meets the requirements of the Compatibility Test 
because there are differing views as to how the test should be applied.188  The 
International Court of Justice has openly recognized that states will have 
mixed beliefs about the application of this test, yet the ICJ has failed to 
clarify the appropriate interpretation.189 
State objections to reservations due to Compatibility Test issues are rare, 
although not unheard of.190  Further, when States do object, they often fail to 
specify as to the legal ramifications of their objection.191  Article 20(4)(b) of 
the VCLT states that if there is an objection made by another contracting 
state to a reservation, that objection “does not preclude the entry into force of 
the treaty as between the objecting and reserving states unless a contrary 
intention is definitively expressed by the objecting State.”192  This reflects 
that objections are both rare and, commonly, inconsequential.   
One reason for the rarity of objections to the legality of a reservation 
based upon the Compatibility Test is that there is a lack of clarity as to the 
residual relationship is between the reserving state and the other States 
Parties.193  The three possible legal effects are: (1) the reserving state remains 
bound to the treaty except for the provision(s) to which the reservation 
related; (2) the invalidity of a reservation nullifies the instrument of 
ratification as a whole and thus the state is no longer a party to the 
agreement; or (3) the invalid reservation can be severed from the instrument 
of ratification such that the state remains bound to the treaty including the 
provision(s) to which the reservation related.194 
This complication is important to note because it allows some breathing 
room for states wishing to submit reservations; the lack of clarity allows 
states to be bold in their submission of reservations. 
VI.  CAN THE UNITED STATES SUCCESSFULLY SUBMIT A RUD TO THE 
CRPD? 
A history of the consequences of RUD usage reveals that the U.S. could 
successfully submit a RUD to the CRPD without drastic results.  Very few 
RUDs blatantly fail the Compatibility Test, thus most reservations are 
                                                                                                                   
 188 Id.   
 189 Swaine, supra note 159, at 283.  
 190 AUST, supra note 7, at 133 (“[M]any states both make reservations and object to 
reservations, though in fact reservations are generally not objected to.”). 
 191 Id. at 142. 
 192 Id. at 141 (emphasis added). 
 193 Swaine, supra note 159, at 293.  
 194 Id. 
2014] U.S. SOVEREIGNTY AND THE CRPD  275 
 
“permitted” even if there is some concern that they are contrary to the object 
and purpose of the treaty.195 
A clear example of a reservation that fails the Compatibility Test can be 
seen in Chile’s reservation to the 1984 Torture Convention.196  Centered 
upon ending torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment in relation to detention and imprisonment, the Torture 
Convention expressly precludes the defense of superior orders.197  Despite 
that prohibition, Chile submitted a reservation that allowed a torturer to plead 
the defense.198  Consequently, several states objected to Chile’s 
reservation.199  The states opined that the reservation was incompatible with 
the object and purpose of the Torture Convention, leading Chile to withdraw 
the reservation.200  Chile’s reservation was in stark contrast to the object and 
purpose of the Torture Convention; thus the reservation collapsed. 
In most situations, however, there is more ambiguity as to how to handle 
a RUD that is perhaps incompatible with a treaty.  Even when some states 
object to another state’s reservation, it is rare for the reservation to 
definitively fail the Compatibility Test.  This is exemplified best by an 
examination of the U.S. reservation to Article 6(5) of the ICCPR.201  The 
U.S. reserved the right, subject to its Constitutional constraints, to “impose 
capital punishment on any person (other than a pregnant woman) duly 
convicted under existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capital 
punishment, including such punishment for crimes committed by persons 
below eighteen years of age.”202  Eleven European nations objected to this 
reservation.203  The basis of those objections was that the U.S. reservation 
amounted to a prohibited general derogation from the Covenant’s prohibition 
on the execution of minors.204   
These objections to the use of capital punishment were particularly 
intriguing because many of the objecting states submitted their own 
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reservations regarding other articles of the Covenant.205  The objections by 
the other states were to different parts of the Covenant in which derogation 
was not permitted, therefore drawing an interesting parallel between those 
reservations and the U.S. reservation to a non-derogable article.206  As a 
result of the objections to Article 6(5), the Human Rights Committee 
expressed its informal view that a reservation to a non-derogable article 
would not necessarily fail the Compatibility Test.207 Nevertheless, the 
Committee did further state that the reservation would place a heavy burden 
on reserving states to justify the reservation.208  Essentially, despite the 
plentiful objections to the U.S. reservation, nothing resulted from them and it 
was never clarified whether the reservation violated the Compatibility 
Test.209  All states objecting to the U.S. reservation currently affirm that the 
“objections shall not constitute an obstacle to the entry into force of the 
Covenant between [the objecting state] and the United States of America.”210  
Despite the controversy over the RUD, the ramifications have been far from 
arduous. 
Furthermore, objections to constitutional and domestic law reservations 
have historically had the same inconsequential effects.  The 1988 U.S. 
reservation to the Genocide Convention demonstrates that constitutional 
reservations are consistently accepted.  The reservation stated: “[N]othing in 
the Convention requires or authorises legislation or other action by the 
United States of America prohibited by the Constitution of the United States 
as interpreted by the United States.”211  The U.S. reservation elicited a 
number of responses from European States, including six objections, but no 
negative ramifications occurred.212  Sweden was the only nation to specify 
the legal effect of such an objection,213 stating that “[I]ts objection does not 
constitute an obstacle to the entry into force of the Convention between 
Sweden and the United States.”214  This illustrates that although some states 
are willing to take the initial step of objecting to a constitutional reservation, 
it is unprecedented for such objections to create any true setbacks for the 
reservation. 
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In response to the increasing use of constitutional RUDs, the U.S. and the 
U.K. have taken noteworthy stances on the topic.215  Because the U.S. 
consistently utilizes constitutional reservations, one would expect for the 
nation to regularly allow other states to submit them as well.  This 
assumption, though logical, has proven false.  The U.S. has been 
unsympathetic towards other nations who utilize constitutional reservations, 
as exemplified by the response to Colombia’s reservation to the Vienna 
Drugs Convention of 1988.216  The U.S. was of the opinion that Colombia’s 
reservation “purports to subordinate Colombia’s obligations under the 
Convention to its Constitution.”217  The U.S. objection reveals the 
complexity behind the current state of reservation use: states object to the 
very same ideas that they later reserve, and a lack of concrete repercussions 
for questionable reservations indicates that objections are mere vocalizations 
of displeasure.   
The U.S. is not alone in its complex response to and use of constitutional 
RUDS.  The U.K. has adopted a cautious and unrevealing stance to 
constitutional reservations.218  Because constitutional reservations make it 
extremely difficult to determine their effect on the reserving state’s 
obligations, the U.K. has a history of simply asking the reserving state for 
clarification rather than objecting to the reservations.219 
Some nations have also utilized reservations designed to specifically 
subordinate a human rights treaty to the domestic law of the nation.  This 
type of reservation, particularly when coupled with a constitutional 
reservation, serves to protect against the very dangers expressed by those 
who oppose ratification of the CRPD.  The consequences of these 
reservations, similar to the consequences of constitutional reservations, seem 
minor.  This can be seen via an examination of Iran’s reservation to the 
Rights of the Child Convention 1989.220  Iran reserved the right “not to apply 
any provisions or articles of the Convention that are incompatible with 
Islamic laws.”221  Although other ratifiers sometimes consider such 
reservations to undermine a commitment to the purpose of the treaty, other 
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states rarely submit an objection with clear legal effects.222  A rare example 
of objections that led to a partial withdrawal of domestic law reservations 
occurred in 1995.223  Malaysia submitted a domestic law reservation to the 
CEDAW Convention 1979 and then subsequently partially withdrew the 
reservation following some objections.224 
Because the U.S. has the ability to submit a RUD to the CRPD, it should 
undoubtedly do so.  A workable solution would be to attach a declaration 
that the Convention is “not self-executing and a package of . . . RUDs 
clarifying that the Convention does not impose any obligations on the United 
States beyond those offered under existing state and federal laws, such as the 
Americans with Disabilities Act.”225  Although submitting a RUD may seem 
perilous, history has shown that such reservations, though not necessarily 
welcomed by the international community, are not frowned upon to the 
extent that other ratifying states will consistently refuse to enforce the treaty 
between the reserver and the objector.  While there are rare instances in 
which a reservation will create such controversy that the reservation is 
eventually withdrawn, that situation atypical.  Many nations have utilized 
constitutional or domestic law reservations in the past and will continue to do 
so despite the multiple limitations of the Compatibility Test.  In fact, 
approximately thirty ratifying states have submitted some form of reservation 
to the CRPD, indicating that a U.S. reservation will not disturb the treaty 
itself.226   
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Although it is likely that the CRPD will be viewed as not self-executing 
and therefore have no drastic effect upon United States domestic law, there is 
the possibility that a U.S. court could declare the CRPD’s provisions to be 
the supreme law of the land, in which case the Disability Committee’s ability 
to interpret the provisions could be substantial.  Because of that 
improbable—yet logical—concern, it would be wise to utilize a RUD. 
Ratifying the CRPD is an important objective for the U.S.  From a foreign 
policy perspective, ratification would commit the U.S. to further disability 
equality, and allow the United States to influence in the subject’s future. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
A revolutionary global step towards equality for individuals with 
disabilities, the U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
serves as a cornerstone of cooperation and initiative.  The CRPD’s far-
reaching effects could have a significant impact upon the world.  The U.S. 
has been a pioneer of disability equality, enacting domestic legislation such 
as the ADA and acting as a foreign policy leader in the quest for disability 
rights.   
Despite such commitments to the cause, U.S. ratification of the CRPD is 
at the center of the debate.  Those who oppose ratification cite sovereignty 
concerns, while supporters firmly contend that the non-binding treaty is 
needed to show an international commitment to disability rights.  One way to 
satisfy both sides is by use of reservations, understandings, or declarations.  
By submitting a reservation to the CRPD, the U.S. would commit to the 
treaty but avoid any concerns about how compliance with the treaty could 
conflict with domestic laws or the U.S. Constitution.   
Utilizing a constitutional or domestic law reservation is potentially 
hazardous due to the ability of other ratifying states to object to the treaty 
based on Compatibility Test concerns, but it is the most effective method of 
appeasing both sides of the aisle.  The odds of calamitous consequences 
arising from a reservation to the CRPD are relatively slim, therefore it is in 
the United States’ best interests to utilize this advantageous tool.  
       
